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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ERIC CHAVEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48304-2020
Bannock County Case No.
CR03-19-12662
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Chavez failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed a unified seven-year sentence with five years fixed for methamphetamine
possession upon its relinquishment of jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
Chavez Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
In November 2019, officers were dispatched the Idaho State University student union

building parking lot for a report of a disturbance. (R., p.12.) There, officers made contact with
an individual who reported that Eric Chavez struck her. (Id.) Officers went to Chavez’s
1

apartment complex to speak with him. (Id.)

There, officers observed Chavez and another

individual standing on a stoop. (Id.) Chavez began walking away and one of the officers called
out, “Police! Stop!” (Id.) Chavez turned and looked at the officer, who told him again to stop.
(Id.) Chavez instead ran away. (Id.) Officers made contact with the other individual on the
stoop, who nodded when asked whether Chavez struck the reporting party. (Id.)
Officers arrested Chavez shortly thereafter for resisting and obstructing an officer. (R.,
pp.12-13.) Incident to that arrest, an officer searched Chavez and recovered a syringe containing
a crystalline residue. (R., p.13.) Field testing revealed the substance to be methamphetamine.
(Id.) Chavez would later acknowledge to the presentence investigator that he had been using
methamphetamine for two days straight and was under the influence of alcohol at the time of his
arrest. (PSI, p.6. 1)
In Bannock County Case No. CR03-19-12662, the state charged Chavez with possession
of methamphetamine and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 2

(R., pp.36-39.)

Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Chavez pled guilty to the methamphetamine charge and
the state dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.66-75; 2/3/20 Tr., p.5, L.4 – p.9, L.1.)
The state also agreed to concur with any sentencing recommendation of the PSI investigator.
(2/3/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.10-12.)
At the sentencing hearing, the state recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction
(5/4/20 Tr., p.13, L.14 – p.14, L.12), and Chavez recommended that the court place Chavez on
probation (5/4/20 Tr., p.14, L.19 – p.15, L.17). The district court imposed a unified seven-year
1

Citations to page numbers of the PSI refer to the page numbers of the electronic file containing
the presentence investigation report and other documents.
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In a separate case that was not a part of the plea agreement in this case, Chavez was also
charged with resisting and obstructing an officer and two counts of battery (Banner County Case
No. CR-03-19-12602). (PSI, p.10.)
2

sentence with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.91-94; 5/4/20 Tr., p.16, L.17 –
p.17, L.24.) However, less than two months after he was transferred to the rider facility, Chavez
was removed from the rider program after violently attacking another inmate over a gambling
debt. (PSI, pp.42, 44, 46.) The district court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing, and
ordered the originally imposed sentence to be executed.

(R., pp.96-97.)

Chavez timely

appealed. (R., pp.99-101.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). The abuse of
discretion test looks to whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
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Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Id. at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895-96, 392
P.3d 1228, 1236-37 (2017) (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628
(2015)). It is well established that the primary sentencing consideration is protection of society,
and that all other factors must be subservient to that end. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627,
873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994).
Chavez’s extensive criminal history warrants the sentence imposed. This was Chavez’s
sixth felony conviction, having previously been convicted in California of second-degree
robbery, felony obstruction of an officer, possession of a controlled substance, grand theft, and
assault with a deadly weapon. (PSI, pp.7-10.) Chavez also has at least five prior misdemeanor
convictions for offenses including obstructing officers and providing false identification. (PSI,
pp.6-10.) Chavez’s presentence investigation report also reflects several unsuccessful attempts
at community supervision. (PSI, p.11.) Chavez acknowledged to the presentence investigator
that he absconded from probation a “couple of times.” (PSI, p.11.) It also appears that Chavez
was on felony probation for grand theft at the time of his arrest in the present case. (PSI, pp.911.)
The presentence investigator opined that Chavez was a poor candidate for community
supervision due to his attitude, his lack of housing and employment, his significant criminal
history, and his need for treatment. (PSI, p.19.) The presentence investigator also noted that
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Chavez was difficult to interview because he was argumentative. (Id.) Chavez scored a 42.0 on
the LSI-R, which is well above the 31+ threshold for indicating a “high” risk of recidivism.
(PSI, p.18.)
Despite all of this, the district court provided Chavez the opportunity to participate in the
rider programming, and specifically stated at the sentencing hearing that it was “hopeful” that
Chavez would do well on that program so his case and sentence could be re-evaluated. (5/4/20
Tr., p.17, Ls.11-15.) Chavez expressed an understanding that he would face the possibility of a
five-year fixed sentence if he “mess[ed] up on the rider.” (5/4/20 Tr., p.18, L.9 – p.19, L.12.)
However, despite this understanding, and less than two months after he was transferred to the
rider program, Chavez attacked a fellow inmate over a gambling debt. (PSI, pp.42, 44.) Chavez
attacked the victim and attempted to pull him off of his bunk. (PSI, p.44.) When he was unable
to do so, Chavez struck the victim with a small wooden table. (Id.) After this, Chavez punched
the victim several times in the head, and then pulled him off the bunk causing the victim to hit
his head. (Id.) Chavez continued to punch the victim, who was then in the fetal position, until a
correctional officer responded to the scene. (Id.) As a result of the attack, Chavez was removed
from the retained jurisdiction program, and the Idaho Department of Correction recommended
that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.42, 44, 46.) The correctional case manager
provided that Chavez “is a risk to those around him and…is not a candidate for probation.” (PSI,
p.47.)
On appeal, Chavez does not take issue with any of the stated analyses as set forth by the
district court. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) Nor does Chavez assert that the district court
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction. (See id.) Instead, Chavez contends that the
district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of mitigating
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factors, including his troubled childhood, his substance abuse, his mental health issues, and his
amenability to treatment as evidenced by factors such as his decision to “move[] away from
California in order to create a better life for himself.” (Id.) However, nothing in the record
indicates that the district court failed to consider any of these things, or chose to disregard the
ample information about these factors presented in the presentence investigation report. Instead,
at the sentencing hearing, the court specifically stated that it had reviewed the presentence
investigation report in making its sentencing determination, and in fact quoted from that report.
(5/4/20 Tr., p.16, L.17 – p.17, L.1.) Further, Chavez’s contentions on appeal that his is amenable
to treatment are questionable in light of his statement to the presentence investigator that he does
not think he needs substance abuse treatment. (PSI, p.16.) Likewise, his contention that his
move from California, where he was involved with gangs, to Idaho, demonstrated a willingness
to try to change his behavior, is weakened by his request to the court for an earlier sentencing
hearing date so he could return to California. (2/3/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-8.)
In light of all of the factors discussed above, the district court acted well within its
discretion to impose a unified seven-year sentence with five years fixed for methamphetamine
possession following its relinquishing of jurisdiction. Chavez has therefore failed to demonstrate
that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. This Court should therefore affirm the
judgment of conviction.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentencing determination of the
district court.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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